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GENERALIZED SUBJECTIVE LEXICOGRAPHIC
EXPECTED UTILITY REPRESENTATION
HUGO CRUZ SANCHEZ
Abstract. We provide foundations for decisions in face of un-
likely events by extending the standard framework of Savage to
include preferences indexed by a family of events. We derive a
subjective lexicographic expected utility representation which al-
lows for infinitely many lexicographically ordered levels of events
and for event-dependent attitudes toward risk. Our model thus
provides foundations for models in finance that rely on different
attitudes toward risk (e.g. Skiadas [9]) and for off-equilibrium rea-
sonings in infinite dynamic games, thus extending and generalizing
the analysis in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel [3].
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1. Introduction
One of the lessons we learn from the theory of refinements of Nash
equilibrium in game theory is that decisions in face of unlikely events
play an important role in determining how a game is to be played.
In particular, the analysis of dynamic games relies heavily on off-
equilibrium reasonings, that is, in determining what would have hap-
pened had players not played what they are supposed to play. We also
learn from finance theory that the attitudes toward risk may depend on
the kinds of events that the agent faces. For instance, it is conceivable
that agents become more risk averse in face of catastrophic, unlikely
events. Lexicographic Expected Utility (LEU) is a sensible approach
to model decisions in face of very unlikely events, as it presumes a hier-
archy of events, ordered by relative unlikeliness, and captures the idea
that once the agent is faced with an unlikely event, he goes down to the
level of the event in the hierarchy and performs a standard expected
utility computation. Thus, a LEU model with infinitely many levels
and level-dependent attitudes toward risk seems to be the right model
to be used in the theory of infinite dynamic games and of financial
theories with varying risk attitudes. It turns out, however, that there
is no decision theoretic foundations for such a model available in the
literature.
This paper fills up this gap. In particular, in a standard Savage-style
framework, we consider a decision maker that is described not only by a
preference relation over acts, but also by a family of preference relations
over acts.1 Each preference in this family is indexed by some event in
the state space. The idea is that a preference indexed by an event, say
%A, where A is the indexing event, represents the preferences of the
agent when the agent is informed that the event A has occurred. We
then provide a list of axioms that such a system of preferences ought to
satisfy and show that decisions that are consistent with the axioms can
be represented by a Generalized Subjective Lexicographic Expected
Utility (GSLEU) functional. Specifically, for a given state space S, a
sigma-algebra Σ on subsets of S and an outcome space O, we consider
a preference relation % and a family (%A)A∈Σ of preference relations
over the space of acts f : S → O. When these preferences satisfy our
axioms, it must be that there exists a (possibly uncountable) family of
events E ⊂ Σ and, for each E ∈ E , a utility function uE : O → R and
1For now this family is taken as a primitive; later we will argue that each prefer-
ence in the family can be inferred as a sort of conditional preference from the given
preference relation over acts.
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a subjective probability measure PE such that an act f is preferred
to an act g under % (in short, f % g) if and only if the subjective
lexicographic expected utility of f is greater than that of g. In symbols,
it must be that if ∫
uE(g)dPE >
∫
uE(f)dPE
for some E ∈ E , then there must exist E ′ ∈ E with E ⊂ E ′ such that∫
uE′(f)dPE′ >
∫
uE′(g)dPE′.
Moreover, for each E ∈ E , PE is uniquely determined, uE is unique
of to affine transformations, and uE is ordinally equivalent to uE′, for
any other E ′ ∈ E . This last property allows the utility indices uE
and uE′ to represent different attitudes toward risk. Observe that the
interpretation of the family E is that of a hierarchy of events, ordered
by relative unlikeliness, in that higher level events are interpreted as
infinitely more likely than lower level events.
To contrast with the existing literature, the most relevant contribu-
tion is that of Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel [3], which, by relaxing
the Archimedian axiom in an Anscombe and Aumann [2] framework
with finitely many states, provide foundations to subjective expected
utility representation with finitely many levels and level-independent
risk attitudes. That is, they establish the existence of one utility index
u and finitely many subjective probability measures (Pℓ)
L
ℓ=1 such that
an act f is preferred to an act g if and only if the existence of a level
ℓ such that ∑
u(g(s))Pℓ(s) >
∑
u(f(s))Pℓ(s)
implies the existence of a level ℓ′ < ℓ such that∑
u(f(s))Pℓ′(s) >
∑
u(g(s))Pℓ′(s).
It is apparent that the the representation derived here is better suited
to the analysis of the problems in game theory and finance mentioned
above, as it allows for infinitely many levels and level-depedent utility
indices.
Moving on to the axioms, we begin by making precise the interpreta-
tion of %A as the preference when the agent is informed that the event
A occurred. We then proceed to relativize the standard Savage axioms
to each of the preferences in the family (%A)A∈Σ. We note that, because
“preferences when informed of an event A” are part of our primitives,
Savage’s Sure Thing Principle has an immediate formulation: if the
agent prefers act f to act g when informed of an event A and also
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when informed of the complement of the event S\A, then f should
indeed be preferred to g. We depart from Savage to allow for lexico-
graphic introspection. What we want to capture is a decision maker
who, when informed than an extremely unlikely event has occurred,
performs the minimal changes in his/her world views in order to make
sense of the unlikely event, and then proceeds as a standard expected
utility maximizer. In lexicographic terms, this means that we are after
a completely ordered hierarchy of levels events, where the order rep-
resents that higher levels are infinitely more likely than lower levels.
When an unlikely event occurs, the decision maker goes down to the
first level at which the event occurs and uses the level’s expected util-
ity terms (utility index and subjective probability.) The crucial feature
in our axioms that represents such a decision maker is the postulate
of existence of a subfamily of events, E ⊂ Σ, satisfying the following
properties. First, it is rich enough to identify relevant events for the
entire family Σ, where “relevance” of an event means that it matters
for some indexed preference in the family. Second, it is not richer than
what is necessary, in the sense that it avoids redundancies. Third, and
more important, the family E connects the corresponding indexed pref-
erences (%)E∈E with the non-indexed preference %, in a lexicographic
fashion.
It is important to note that the existence of the family E , as postu-
lated by our axioms, is far from enough for our representation result.
In fact, our Theorem 1 shows that the other axioms already imply the
existence of a hierarchy of classes of events ordered by “relative nul-
lity”: events in a class α are of “comparable likelihood”, meaning that
neither is null relative to the other, but an event in a class α is “infin-
itely less likely” than an event in a higher class β ≫ α, meaning that it
is null relative to that event. In fact, such other axioms already imply
the existence of a qualitative probability for each class, which is the key
ingredient for our generalized lexicographic expected utility represen-
tation.2 The role played by the postulated family E is that it provides
the necessary “top events” for each class α. That is, we show that, for
any class α, there exists an event E ∈ E that can be interpreted as the
“local state space” for the class α: the expected utility representation
for class α is determined by E, in that every event A in the class α
shares the same utility index uE and the subjective probability PA can
be computed as the conditional of PE given A.
2Also, as relativizations of Savage’s axioms, they also imply a SEU representation
for each event A ∈ Σ.
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With the axiom system in place, we are able to establish our GSLEU
representation result in Theorem 3. That is, if a decision maker is
represented by a preference % and also by a family of indexed pref-
erences (%A)A∈Σ, and this system of preferences satisfies our axioms,
then choices can be represented by those that maximize the GSLEU
functional. An important issue at this juncture, however, is whether
the assumed “informed” preferences (%A)A∈Σ can be inferred from a
given “uninformed” preference % over acts.
We provide a positive answer to this question, by means of a notion of
conditioning the preference % on an event A that captures what the so
far primitive notion %A is meant to capture. Our notion of conditioning
is stronger than Savage’s notion because it also requires checking for
whether “perturbations” of an act f are (conditionally) preferred to
another act g. More precisely, Savage’s notion of conditioning says
that an act f is preferred to an act g conditional on an event A if the
act fAh is preferred to the act gAh, for any other act h, where the
notation “fAh” means the act that is equal to f on A and equal to h
on the complement of A. On top of that, we add that the act f˜Ah must
be preferred to the act gAh and that the act fAh must be preferred to
the act g˜Ah, where f˜Ah represents a perturbation of the act fAh that
is equal to f on most of A but equal to some other constant act on a
small part of A, and is equal to h on the complement of A. We show in
Theorem 4 that this stronger notion of conditioning characterizes the
informed preferences %A, for each A ∈ Σ.
In words, we can in principle tease out of % the “strong” conditional
preferences %A, A ∈ Σ, by offering choices of acts and perturbed acts.
In decision theoretic jargon, this means that the primitives %A, A ∈ Σ,
are observable. But Theorem 4 is interesting from other perspectives
as well. For instance, a classical question in probability is the issue of
probabilities conditional on zero probability events. Our strong condi-
tioning provide insights on computing conditionals on infinitely unlikely
events by also requiring that the computation be robust to small per-
turbations. Relatedly, refinements of equilibrium in game theory often
require consideration of perturbations of strategies/payoffs. Our notion
of conditioning seems to capture exactly the need for such perturba-
tions. These are questions that we plan to address in future research.
1.1. Related Literature. As advanced above, Blume, Brandenburger
and Dekel [3] provide foundations for a SLEU representation that
is special in that it does not allow for infinitely many levels or for
level-dependent risk attitudes. These issues are consequences of the
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Anscombe-Aumann framework adopted, since it assumes a finite state
space and only considers acts that are mixture-space valued. The ex-
tension to an infinite state space is not a simple matter. LaValle and
Fishburn [6] provide an extension of a finite SLEU representation in
a finite state space to such a representation in an infinite state space,
while still only allowing for finitely many lexicographic levels. The ex-
tension is technical in nature, and does not really extend the SLEU
model to an infinite version, as it is done here. Our contribution can,
in fact, be viewed as a first step in providing a complete infinite exten-
sion of the analysis in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel [3]: they do
not assume, as we do here, the existence of a primitive lexicographic
order; the lexicographic representation is a consequence of their relax-
ation of the Archimedian axiom. Because in our infinite framework
we do not even have a well-ordered space of classes of events to be-
gin with, it is not clear how a non-Archimedian approach would work.
This is another question for future research. A related paper is that
of Amarante [1], which does allow for infinitely many “informed” (or
conditional) preferences by also considering a family of such prefer-
ences as a primitive of the model, but does not provide a lexicographic
representation, as the focus of the paper is to show that a family of
SEU conditional preferences does not necessarily give rise to an SEU
unconditional preference.
We move now to Section 2 where the basic framework and axioms are
presented. The results are in Section 3 and the conclusion in Section
4. The Appendix contains the results not proved in the main text.
2. Setting and Axioms
Following Savage [8] and Machina and Schmeidler [7] (including the
naming of axioms), our setting is as follows: S is the infinite set of
states, which capture the uncertainty present in the decision-making
process, Σ ⊆ 2S is the σ−algebra of events, O is the set of out-
comes, F is the set of Σ−measurable functions from S to O with finite
range. This is the set of acts that represents the possible choices in
the decision-making process. A weak order (complete and transitive
binary relation) represents the ranking of the decision-maker over F .
In addition to this classical setting, %A is a weak preference on F for
each event A in Σ.
Notation 1. For an event A, and a pair of acts f and g, fAg repre-
sents the composed act that is equal to f on A and g on S\A.
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Notation 2. For a weak order % on a non empty set X, and a pair of
elements of X, f and g,
f ≻ g ⇔ (f % g) and (not (g % f))
and
f ∼ g ⇔ (f % g) and (g % f) .
Definition 1 (agree). %A agree with %B iff, for each pair of acts f
and g,
f %A g ⇔ f %B g.
Our first axiom on the primitives makes precise the idea that %A
is indeed a “preference when informed of event A”. Such definition
meets Savage’s idea of ordering if A were known to obtain (page 22,
Savage [8], “What technical interpretation can be attached to the idea
that f would be preferred to g, if B were known to obtain? Under
any reasonable interpretation, the matter would seem not to depend
on the values f and g assume at states outside of B”) In particular,
the preference indexed by the empty event is degenerate (i.e. each
act is weakly preferred to any act). However, axioms P31
2
and P51
2
below ensure that no weak preference indexed by a non empty event is
degenerate.
Axiom 1 (P11
2
). For each pair of acts f and g,
f %A g ⇒ fAh %A gAh for each act h
and
fAh %A gAh for some act h⇒ f %A g.
In Savage [8], a null event is an event that is irrelevant for the
decision-making process. However, in our framework, the decision-
making process has multiple levels, and an event can be irrelevant at
some levels, but relevant for others. Thus, our concept of null event is
relative to each indexed preference.
Definition 2 (null event). For each pair of events A and B such that
B ⊆ A, B is a null event at A if and only if %A\B agrees with %A.
Note that the concept of null event at A refers only to events (i.e.
belonging to Σ) contained in A. The empty event is null at every A,
even when A is the empty event.
The next axiom is the sure thing principle, and it relates different
indexed preferences. It says that the act f is weakly preferred to the
act g for the preference indexed by an event A if f is weakly preferred
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to g for the preferences indexed by each event of a bipartition of A, and
the order between f and g is strict for the preference indexed by A if it
is strict for the preference indexed by an event of the bipartition which
is non null at A. This is consistent with Savage’s first formulation of
the sure thing principle (page 21, Savage [8]), “Having suggested what
I shall tentatively call the sure-thing principle, let me give it relatively
formal formal statement thus: If the person would not prefer f to g,
either knowing that the event B obtained, or knowing that the event
S\B obtained, then he does not prefer f to g. Moreover (provided he
does not regard B as virtually impossible) if he would definitely prefer
g to f , knowing that B obtained, and, if he would not prefer f to g,
knowing that B did not obtain, then he definitely prefers g to f .”)
Axiom 2 (P21
2
). For each pair of events A and B such that B ⊆ A,
and each pair of acts f and g,
f %B g and f %A\B g ⇔ f %A g
and
B is non null at A⇒
(
f ≻B g and f %A\B g ⇒ f ≻A g
)
.
The next axiom says that constant acts are equally ordered by the
preferences indexed by non empty events, and it is called eventwise
monotonicity.
Axiom 3 (P31
2
). For each non empty event A, and constant acts f
and g,
f %A g ⇔ f %S g.
The next axiom says that an event is more likely than a second event,
if a prize resulting from the first event is preferred to the same prize
resulting from the second event, independently of the prize. It is called
weak comparative probability - prize independence.
Axiom 4 (P41
2
). For each triple of events A,B and C such that B,C ⊆
A, and constant acts f, f ′, g and g′ such that f %S f
′ and g %S g
′,
fBf ′ %A fCf
′ ⇒ gBg′ %A gCg
′.
The next axiom implies nondegeneracy for each preference indexed
by a non empty event, and it is called nondegeneracy.
Axiom 5 (P51
2
). There is at least two constant acts f and g such that
f ≻S g.
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The axioms above are readily seem as translations of the usual Savage
axioms to our setting with an additional family of informed preferences.
The next two axioms are particular of our framework. The first restricts
the allowed families of indexed preferences. It says that any allowed
family of indexed preferences must contain an essential subfamily that
is sufficient to determine if an event is relevant for the family (i.e. an
event whose subtraction matters for some indexed preference of the
family). It is called separability axiom (SE) because the subfamily
separates events (by symmetric difference on Σ), which means that
each event of Σ is used in the comparison between a pair of acts, if
preferences indexed by non empty events are non degenerate (which is
true by P51
2
.)
Axiom 6 (SE). There exists a subfamily %E, with E ∈ E ⊆Σ\{∅},
of the family of indexed preferences satisfies the following:
∀B ∈ Σ

 ∀E ∈ E
(
B ⊆ E ⇒%E agrees with %E\B
)
⇒
∀A ∈ Σ
(
B ⊆ A⇒%A agrees with %A\B
)

 ,
and,
∀A ∈ Σ, ∀E ∈ E

E ⊆ A⇒ %A agrees with %A\Eor
%A agrees with %E

 .
In order to better understand what is implied by Axiom SE, we
argue that it is a necessary condition for any subjective lexicographic
utility representation with at least one event of probability one in each
class of the hierarchy of classes. In fact, if we have a subjective lexi-
cographic utility representation with at least one event of probability
one in each class of the hierarchy of classes, then for any class, we have
a preference induced by the subjective expected utility representation
of the class. Also, for each event of the class (so, a non null event), we
have a preference indexed by the event corresponding to the preference
induced by the subjective expected utility representation conditioned
on the event. The preference indexed by the event of probability one
of the class (by assumption) agrees with the preference induced by the
subjective expected utility representation of the class, and this is true
for any other event of probability one of the class. Any event of the
class containing an event of probability one of the class is an event of
probability one of the class, in particular, the union of an event of the
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class with an event of probability one of the class. Thus, the class con-
tains a cofinal subset of events of probability one, which is a singleton
only when the class contains an event containing every event of the
class. A preference indexed by an event A containing an event E of
this subset does not agree with the preference indexed by E if and only
if A is of a higher class of the hierarchy (in this case, the preference
indexed by A\E agree with the preference indexed by A, because E is
irrelevant for higher classes). And finally, an event B irrelevant for an
event E ⊇ B of the subset is irrelevant for the class, so for any event
A ⊇ B of the class.
On the other hand, when combined with the other axioms above, SE
is a sufficient condition for a subjective lexicographic utility represen-
tation with at least one event of probability one in each class of the
hierarchy of classes.
The next axiom says that the ordering between acts for the preference
% coincides with the ordering between acts resulting from using the
lexicographic rule of comparison on preferences indexed by chains of
events in E ordered by the set inclusion ⊇.
Axiom 7 (P01
2
). For each pair of acts f and g,
f % g
iff
g ≻E f for some E ∈ E ⇒ f ≻E′ g for some E
′ ∈ E st E ′ ⊇ E.
The lexicographic rule of comparison on a (maybe uncountable) in-
finite and order-dense hierarchy implies a transitive strict binary re-
lation, but the indifference binary relation might violate transitivity.
Axiom P01
2
allows us to by-pass this intransitivity issue, by working
as a criterion on the set of families of indexed preferences. Similarly
as above, note that P01
2
is a necessary condition for any subjective
lexicographic utility representation of a weak order in general.
Our final axiom is the usual technical requirement to obtain quan-
titative probabilities out of qualitative ones. It is called small-event
continuity.
Axiom 8 (P61
2
). For each non empty event A, and each triple of
acts f, g and h such that f ≻A g and h constant, there exists a finite
Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai, such that, for each i,
f ≻A hAig
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and
hAif ≻A g.
3. Results
We begin with a result that follows from P11
2
to P51
2
, asserting the
existence of a hierarchy of disjoint families of events, and describing its
main properties. The proof is a series of results in the appendix A.
Theorem 1. There is a partition of Σ in classes of events ordered by
an irreflexive, transitive and total order ≫. The lowest class is the
class containing the empty event (a singleton called trivial class), and
the highest class is the class containing S. An event of a non trivial
class α is non null relatively to other event of the class (i.e. each of
the two events is non null at the union of both events), but it is null
relatively to an event of a higher class β (i.e. β ≫ α). Subevents
(superevents) of an event of a non trivial class α belong to a class no
higher (lower) than α. Each class α is closed for the union of an event
of α and an event of a class no higher than α.
From P11
2
to P61
2
, we have the following theorem asserting the ex-
istence of a subjective expected utility representation for the indexed
preferences, and describing the relations intraclass and interclass for
these representations. The proof is a series of results in appendices A
and B.
Theorem 2. For a non trivial class α, there exists a unique (up to
a positive affine transformations) function uα : O → R, and for each
event A of the class, there exists a unique finitely additive, convex-
valued probability measure3 PA on Σ, such that, for each pair of acts f
and g,
f %A g ⇔
∫
uα (f) dPA ≥
∫
uα (g) dPA.
Moreover, for another event B ⊆ A of the class, PA (C) = PB (C)PA (B)
for an event C ⊆ B. In addition, different non trivial classes admit
different attitudes toward risk when O is not a mixture space.
We are now ready to establish our main representation result. It
follows from P01
2
to P61
2
, and SE, and it asserts the existence of a
generalized lexicographic subjective expected utility representation.
3Indeed, PA (·) is defined on Σ|A, but it can be extended to a probability on Σ
as PA (A ∩ ·). We will keep the simpler notation in the paper.
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Theorem 3 (Representation Result). There exists a family of real
functions on O, {uE}E∈E, with each uE unique (up to positive affine
transformations), and a unique family of finitely additive, convex-valued
probability measures on Σ, {PE}E∈E, such that, for each pair of acts f
and g,
f % g
iff∫
uE (g) dPE >
∫
uE (f) dPE
for some E ∈ E
⇒
∫
uE′ (f) dPE′ >
∫
uE′ (g) dPE′
for some E ′ ∈ E st E ′ ⊇ E
.
Proof. First, note that P31
2
and P51
2
implies that preferences indexed
by non empty events are non degenerated, so no non empty event
is null at itself, and, by SE, for each non empty event A, there is
an event E in E , containing A, and belonging to same class than A.
Thus, E contains a cofinal subset of each non trivial class. By SE,
for each pair of events of E in a class, E and E ′, %E agree with %E′,
so E\E ′, E ′\E and E∆E ′ are null events at some event of E in the
class, containing E ∪ E ′ (the class is closed for finite unions, and E
contains a cofinal subset of each non trivial class). By (2), each event
of E in the class has a subjective expected utility representation, and
they are equivalent representations. More specifically, the Bernoulli
indexes of those representations are equal to the Bernoulli index of the
class, and the beliefs (extended to Σ) assign the same probability to the
events. As every event in the class is contained in some event in that
subset of the class, the belief (extended to Σ) of the subjective utility
representation of every event in the class which contains an event in
that subset of the class assign probability one to each event in that
subset of the class. In other words, they are essential top events. And,
given the derived properties of E , the representation for % follows from
P01
2
. 
Each essential “top events” in E corresponds to a class, so the de-
scription of the relations intraclass and interclass in Theorem 2 holds
for the representation in Theorem 3.
We now move to the issue of observability of %A, that is, that %A
can be inferred from choices that respect % over acts that “strongly”
reveal the subjective assessments of the decision maker as to the event
A relative to its complement S\A.
Theorem 4 (Observability of informed preferences). For each non
empty event A, and each triple of acts f , g and h, f ≻A g if, and
only if, fAh ≻ gAh and, for each constant act k, there exists a finite
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Σ−measurable partition of A, (Ai)
n
i=1, such that, for each i = 1, ..., n,
kAi (fAh) ≻ gAh and fAh ≻ kAi (gAh).
Proof. Note that fAh ∼ gAh implies fAh ∼E gAh for any top event
E ⊇ A of the class of A, and, by the lemma order-preserving (see
appendix Proofs), this implies fAh ∼A gAh, which implies f ∼A g (eq.
f ≻A g implies fAh ≻A gAh, and using the same steps and lemma,
we have fAh ≻ gAh), but the converse is not necessarily true. We
can have fAh ≻ gAh and fAh ∼A gAh, if fAh is (strictly) preferred
to gAh for some class α lower than the class of A, and for any class
higher than α, gAh is not (strictly) preferred to fAh. In what follows
we discuss the effects of perturbations on the case fAh ∼A gAh.
By P31
2
and P51
2
, we can choose a pair of constant acts k ≻S k
′.
Besides, k and k′ can satisfy the following: k is preferred (by P31
2
,
we do not need to specify an indexed preference) to any constant
act with outcome belonging to f (A) ∪ g (A) (a finite set), and any
constant act with outcome belonging to f (A) ∪ g (A) is preferred to
k′. A finite Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai, defines a finer finite
Σ−measurable partition of A, Pf = {Ai ∩ f
−1 (o) : i and o ∈ f (A)}
(for g, the discussion that follows is analogous). For Pf , we have
∪iAi ∩ f
−1 (o) = A ∩ f−1 (o), so, if A ∩ f−1 (o) is non null at A,
Ai ∩ f
−1 (o) is non null at A for some i (name it io). Thus, if for
each o′ ∈ f (A) such that A ∩ f−1 (o′) is non null at A, k is preferred
to the constant act with outcome o′, and this ordering is strict at least
once (name it o), then4 kAio (fAh) ≻A fAh. And, if for each o
′ ∈ f (A)
such that A ∩ f−1 (o′) is non null at A, the constant act with outcome
o′ is preferred to k′, and this ordering is strict at least once (name it o),
then fAh ≻A k
′Aio (fAh). Summing up, for each o ∈ f (A) such that
4If for each o′ ∈ f (A) such that A ∩ f−1 (o′) is non null at A, k is preferred to
the constant act with outcome o′, and this ordering is strict at least once (name it
o), then
k
(
Aio ∩ f
−1 (o)
)
(fAh) ≻Aio∩f−1(o) fAh
and
k
(
Aio ∩ f
−1 (o)
)
(fAh) ∼A−(Aio∩f−1(o)) fAh,
so, by P2 12 ,
k
(
Aio ∩ f
−1 (o)
)
(fAh) ≻A fAh.
This one element substitution can be repeated for each o′′ ∈ f (A) such that Aio ∩
f−1 (o′′) is non empty, and, by P2 12 at each step, after a finite number of one
element substitutions, we obtain
kAio (fAh) ≻A fAh.
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A ∩ f−1 (o) is non null at A, either k is strictly preferred to the con-
stant act with outcome o, or the constant act with outcome o is strictly
preferred to k′, or both, so, for each o ∈ f (A) such that A ∩ f−1 (o) is
non null at A, and for each finite Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai,
kAio (fAh) ≻A fAh or fAh ≻A k
′Aio (fAh) .
In addition (for f and g shifted, the discussion that follows is analo-
gous), if, for each o ∈ f (A) such that A ∩ f−1 (o) is non null at A, the
constant act with outcome o is indifferent to k′, and, for each o′ ∈ g (A)
such that A∩g−1 (o′) is non null at A, k is indifferent to the constant act
with outcome o′, then gAh ∼A kAh ≻A k
′Ah ∼A fAh, an absurd . So,
if k′Ah ∼A fAh, then for at least one o
′ ∈ g (A) such that A∩g−1 (o′) is
non null at A, k is strictly preferred to the constant act with outcome
o′, and kAio′ (gAh) ≻A gAh. And, if kAh ∼A fAh, then for at least
one o′ ∈ g (A) such that A ∩ g−1 (o′) is non null at A, the constant act
with outcome o′ is strictly preferred to k′, and gAh ≻A k
′Aio′ (gAh).
Summing up, for each finite Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai,
5
k′Ah ∼A fAh⇒ ∃i (kAi (gAh) ≻A gAh) ,
kAh ∼A fAh⇒ ∃i (gAh ≻A k
′Ai (gAh)) ,
and,
kAh ≻A fAh ≻A k
′Ah⇒ ∃i, j (kAi (fAh) ≻A fAh ≻A k
′Aj (fAh)) .
Concluding, the set of rules above shows that, for fAh ∼A gAh, and
using k and k′, any finite Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai, generates
a set of perturbed versions of fAh, and a set of perturbed versions of
gAh, which meet at some side (strict upper/lower set) of fAh ∼A gAh.
On the other hand, for fAh ≻A gAh, P6
1
2
ensures that, for each
constant act k, there exists a finite Σ−measurable partition of A, Ai,
such that, for each i, kAi (fAh) ≻A gAh and fAh ≻A kAi (gAh).
As, for each strict ordering for the preference indexed by A corre-
sponds a strict ordering for % (Savage-like) conditioned by A, we can
conclude that fAh ≻ gAh (gAh ≻ fAh) with fAh ∼A gAh is not
preserved by perturbations in the sense of P61
2
. 
As we advanced in the introduction, our concept of conditioning is
more intricate than Savage’s conditioning. It involves Savage’s con-
ditioning, and also conditioning of perturbations of acts. Using this
5k′Ah ∼A fAh means that perturbations of fAh are in the upper set of fAh,
with some in the strict upper set.
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concept of conditioning, we can define indexed preferences from %. In
this approach, the axioms are properties of %. In particular, P01
2
says
that % has an internal consistency rule that says that more inclusive
events are more decisive for the ordering between acts.
4. Conclusion
We provided a first step into a fully general foundation to subjective
lexicographic expected utility. For the applied literature, we provide
foundations for source-dependent risk attitudes (e.g. Skiadas [9].) For
off-equilibrium reasonings in dynamic games, we provide a general the-
ory supporting standard arguments that invoke “infinitely less likely
events” in dynamic games with infinite horizon. Although we do show
that there is no need to use a family of indexed preferences as a prim-
itive of the model, we still need to impose an a priori lexicographic
order to obtain our representation. For the future, we plan to dispense
with such assumption, and obtain a lexicographic order directly from
the implied hierarchy of classes of events that follow from our other
axioms. We also plan to explore the implications of our “perturbed”
conditionals to the foundations of refinements of equilibria in game
theory.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Lemma 1. For each A ∈ Σ, %A is a weak preference on F such that,
for each acts f and g,
f ≻A g ⇒ fAh ≻A gAh for each act h
and
fAh ≻A gAh for some act h⇒ f ≻A g.
Proof. Observe that gAh %A fAh for some act h implies g %A f , thus,
if f ≻A g then fAh ≻A gAh for each act h. Besides, observe that
g %A f implies that gAh %A fAh for each act h, thus, if fAh ≻A gAh
for some act h, then f ≻A g. 
Lemma 2. For an event B, f ∼A fBh for each pair of acts f and h,
iff, for each event C disjoint of B, fCh ∼A gCh for each triple of acts
f , g and h.
Proof. Note that fCh and gCh are equal at B. 
Lemma 3. If B ⊆ A is a null event at A, then, for each event C
disjoint of A\B, fCh ∼A gCh for each triple of acts f , g and h.
Proof. By P11
2
, f ∼A\B f (A\B)h for each pair of acts f and h. Thus,
the result follows from (2) and the definition of null event. 
In (3), if, for each event C disjoint of A\B, fCh ∼A gCh for each
triple of acts f , g and h, then (2) implies that f ∼A f (A\B)h for each
pair of acts f and h. However, %A\B does not need to agree with %A,
so B does not need to be a null event at A. Nevertheless, P11
2
to P31
2
,
and P51
2
, ensure that B ⊆ A is a null event at A.
Lemma 4 (order preserving - new version). If B ⊆ A is a non null
event at A, then, for each pair of acts f and g,
f %B g ⇔ fBh %A gBh for each act h.
Proof. By P11
2
, (i) f %B g iff fBh %B gBh for each act h, and (ii)
fBh ∼A\B gBh for each act h.
By the first part of P21
2
, if fBh %B gBh for each act h, then fBh %A
gBh for each act h. As B is non null at A, by the second part of P21
2
,
if fBh ≻B gBh for each act h, then fBh ≻A gBh for each act h. 
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Lemma 5 (order-preserving - old version). For each A,B ∈ Σ such
that B ⊆ A, B is non null at A, and acts f and g,
f %B g ⇔ fBh %A gBh for each act h.
Proof. By definition, f %B g implies fBh %B gBh for each act h. By
sure-thing consistency, and h ∼A\B h for each act h, fBh %A gBh for
each act h. Analogously, by lemma above, f ≻B g implies fBh ≻B gBh
for each act h. By sure-thing consistency, B is non null at A, and
h ∼A\B h for each act h, fBh ≻A gBh for each act h. 
Next lemma says that, a Savage-like null event with relation to an
indexed preference, and contained in the indexing event, is a null event
for the indexed preference.
Lemma 6. If, for an event B ⊆ A, fBh ∼A gBh, for each triple of
acts f , g and h, then B is a null event at A (a partial converse for
(3)).
Proof. If A is the empty event, the result is trivial.
Assume that A is a non empty event. By P11
2
, fBh ∼A\B gBh, for
each triple of acts f , g and h. If B is non null at A, then, by the second
part of P21
2
, fBh ∼B gBh, for each triple of acts f , g and h. By P1
1
2
,
P31
2
and P51
2
, B is the empty event, a contradiction (B is non null at
A). Thus, B is null at A. 
Theorem 5 (Nullity). For each triple of events A,B and C such that
C ⊆ B ⊆ A,
B is null at A =⇒ C is null at A,
C and B\C are null at A =⇒ B is null at A,
and
C is null at B =⇒ C is null at A.
Proof. By (3) and (6), C is null at A if B is null at A.
If, fCh ∼A gCh and f (B\C)h ∼A g (B\C)h, for each triple of acts
f , g and h, then fCf (B\C)h ∼A gCf (B\C)h and f (B\C) gCh ∼A
g (B\C) gCh, for each triple of acts f , g and h. By transitivity, fBh ∼A
gBh, for each triple of acts f , g and h. So, by (3) and (6), B is null at
A if C and B\C are null at A.
If B is null at A, the third case above is a particular case of the first
case above. So, assuming that B is non null at A, if fCh ∼B gCh for
each triple of acts f , g and h, then, by (4), fCh ∼A gCh for each triple
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of acts f , g and h. So, by (3) and (6), C is null at A if C is null at
B. 
Definition 3 (≥A). For each triple of events A,B and C such that
B,C ⊆ A, and constant acts f and g such that f %S g, B is at least
as probable as C at A, and denoted by B ≥A C (for the definitions of
>A and =A see (2)), when
fBg %A fCg.
Lemma 7. If B,C ⊆ D are null at D, then B =D C.
Proof. By nullity, B ∪ C is null at D, consequently, %D\(B∪C) and %D
agree. I.e., prizes at B or C are negligible. 
Lemma 8. If B ⊆ D is null at D, then B =D ∅.
Proof. By definition, ∅ is null atD, thus, by lemma above, B =D ∅. 
Lemma 9. If A ⊆ B ⊆ C then B ≥C A. Besides, B >C A iff B\A is
not null at C.
Proof. First, observe that for each pair of acts f and g, by the definition
of %C\B and %A, fBg ∼C\B fAg and fBg ∼A fAg.
Given constant acts f and g such that f %S g, by eventwise mono-
tonicity or by the definition of %∅, f %B\A g. By nondegeneracy,
f and g can satisfy f ≻S g, thus, if B\A is non null at C,then
f ≻B\A g and, by nullity, B is non null at C and B\A is non null
at B. If B\A is null at C, then %(C\B)⊔A agree with %C , consequently,
fBg ∼C fAg; otherwise, by the discussion above and the sure-thing
consistency, fBg ≻C fAg. 
Lemma 10. If A,B ⊆ C, A is null at C and B is non null at C, then
A ∪B =C B.
Proof. By nullity, as B is non null at C, then A ∪ B is non null at C.
Now, take B ⊆ A ∪ B ⊆ C and use the lemma above. 
Lemma 11. If C ⊆ D and C is non null at D, then C >D ∅.
Proof. Given constant acts f and g such that f ≻S g (nondegeneracy),
by eventwise monotonicity, f ≻C g, consequently, by order-preserving
lemma,
fCg ≻D gCg = g = f∅g.

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Lemma 12. If B,C ⊆ D, B is null at D and C is non null at D, then
C >D B.
Proof. Both lemmas above imply that, given constant acts f and g
such that f ≻S g (nondegeneracy),
fCg ≻D f∅g ∼D fBg.

Lemma 13. C 6= ∅ is non null at C.
Proof. By nondegeneracy and eventwise monotonicity, %∅ and %C do
not agree. 
Lemma 14. If A ⊆ C 6= ∅ is null at C then C\A is non null at C.
Proof. By nullity and lemma above. 
Lemma 15. If A ⊆ B ⊆ C, B is non null at C and A is null at C,
then A is null at B.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that A is non null at B. By nonde-
generacy and eventwise monotonicity, there exist constant acts f and
g such that f ≻A g. By order-preserving lemma, as A is non null at
B, fAh ≻B gAh for each act h. Again, by order-preserving lemma, as
B is non null at C, fAh ≻C gAh for each act h. Thus, A is non null
at C, an absurd. 
If B was null at C in the lemma above, A could be null at B (e.g.
A = ∅) or A could be non null at B (e.g. A = B).
Definition 4 (qualitative probability). A relation ≥A between events
is a qualitative probability on A 6= ∅, iff, for each triple of events B, C
and D contained in A, D disjoint of B ∪ C,
≥A is a weak ordering,
B ≥A ∅, A >A ∅
and
B ≥A C ⇔ B ∪D ≥A C ∪D.
Theorem 6. Given C ∈ Σ, C 6= ∅, the relation ≥C is a qualitative
probability on (C, {A ∈ Σ : A ⊆ C}).
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Proof. (1). ≥C is a weak preference follows from the fact that %C is a
weak preference.
(2). For each B ⊆ C, and constant acts f and g such that f %S g;
by eventwise monotonicity (B 6= ∅), or by definition of %∅ (B = ∅),
f %B g. Using the definition of %B, fBg %B g is true. As fBg ∼C\B
g, by sure-thing principle,
fBg %C g = f∅g,
i.e., B ≥C ∅.
(3). By nondegeneracy, there are constant acts f and g such that
f ≻S g, so, by eventwise monotonicity, f ≻C g. Using the lemma after
the definition of %C , fCg ≻C g = f∅g is true. I.e.C >C ∅.
(4). For A,B,D ∈ Σ such that A,B,D ⊆ C and D∩A = D∩B = ∅,
and constant acts f and g; if C\D is null at C then %D agree with %C
and, using the definition of %D,
fBg ∼ DfAg
f (B ∪D) g ∼ Df (A ∪D) g,
so, B =C A =C ∅ and B ∪D =C A ∪D; but if C\D is non null at C,
as, by the definition of %C\D,
fBg ∼ C\Df (B ∪D) g
fAg ∼ C\Df (A ∪D) g
and, by sure-thing consistency and C\D is non null at C,
fBg % C\DfAg ⇔ fBg %C fAg
f (B ∪D) g % C\Df (A ∪D) g ⇔ f (B ∪D) g %C f (A ∪D) g,
then
fBg %C fAg ⇔ f (B ∪D) g %C f (A ∪D) g.

The lemma below defines the relation ≥D as the unique qualitative
probability (C,D 6= ∅, by assumption) at any C ⊆ D non null at D.
Lemma 16 (weak comparative probability - event independence).
Given A,B,C,D ∈ Σ such that A,B ⊆ C ⊆ D, C non null at D,
B ≥C A⇐⇒ B ≥D A.
Proof. Given constant acts f and g, by order-preserving lemma and C
non null at D,
fAg %C fBg ⇔ fAg %D fBg.
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
Definition 5 (fine). A qualitative probability ≥A (A 6= ∅) is fine, iff,
for each event B contained in A such that B >A ∅, there exits a finite
Σ− measurable partition of A, Ai, satisfying B >A Ai for each i.
Lemma 17 (fineness). For each C 6= ∅, ≥C is fine.
Proof. Let B ⊆ C be a non null event at C. By nondegeneracy, there
exist constant acts f and g such that, f ≻S g, and, by eventwise
monotonicity, f ≻B g. By order-preserving lemma and B is non null at
C, fBg ≻C g. Next, by small event continuity, there is a finite partition
of C, {Ai}
n
i=1 ⊆ Σ, such that fBg ≻C fAig for each i = 1, ..., n. In
other words, B >C Ai for each i = 1, ..., n (i.e., ≥C is fine). 
Definition 6 (tight). A qualitative probability ≥A (A 6= ∅) is tight, iff,
B =A C, for each pair of events B and C contained in A, satisfying:
B ∪D >A C and C ∪ E >A B,
for each pair of events D and E contained in A, and such that,
D,E >A ∅ and B ∩D = ∅ = C ∩ E.
Lemma 18 (fineness and tightness). Given A,B ⊆ C, if B >C A then
there exists a finite partition of C, {Ai}
n
i=1 ⊆ Σ, such that B >C A∪Ai
for each i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. B >C A implies fBg ≻C fAg for some constant acts f and g
such that f ≻S g (nondegeneracy), C 6= ∅ and B non null at C. By
small event continuity, there is a finite partition of C, {Ai}
n
i=1 ⊆ Σ,
such that fBg ≻C fAi (fAg) = f (A ∪ Ai) g for each i = 1, ..., n. In
other words, B >C A ∪Ai for each i = 1, ..., n. 
Several conclusions can be obtained from facts above (see theorem
3, page 37, [8], and page 195, [4]). Besides, properties provided above
imply that, for each qualitative probability at each non empty event,
there exists a unique finitely additive probability (fap) representing
it (see theorem 14.2, page 195, and its proof in 198-199, [4]), with the
caveat that, for any C ⊆ D non null at D, the fap at C is the fap at D
conditioned at C. Furthermore, these properties imply the existence of
a SEU representation for each non empty event (see next appendix).
From the theorem 6 proved above, for each C 6= ∅, ≥C is a qualitative
probability. Using the lemma 18 and theorem 4 (page 38, [8]), ≥C is
fine and tight. By the corollary 1 (page 38, [8]), the only probability
measure that almost agrees with ≥C (if an event is at least as probable
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as another event, then the probability of the first event is greater than
or equal to the probability of the second event), strictly agrees (an event
is at least as probable as another event, iff, the probability of the first
event is greater than or equal to the probability of the second event)
with it. By the theorem 3 (page 37, [8]), there exists one and only
one PC on (C, {A ∈ Σ : A ⊆ C}) that almost agrees with ≥C Thus,
there exists one and only one PC on (C, {A ∈ Σ : A ⊆ C}) that strictly
agrees with ≥C .
In those lemmas and theorems other properties of PC are provided.
The most important is convex-valuedness, that is, for each B ⊆ C
and λ ∈ [0, 1] there exists A ⊆ B such that PC (A) = λPC (B). This
property is used for defining specific partitions of an event with pre-
established probabilities and outcomes.
Let {PA}A∈Σ\{∅} be the family of finitely additive probabilities from
the theorem 14.2, [4], where PA represents ≥A, and if A is non null at
B ⊇ A, by weak comparative probability - event independence, and
uniqueness, PA is PB conditioned on A. Of course, if C ⊇ B and A is
non null at C, then B is non null at C, PA is PC conditioned on A and
PB is PC conditioned on B. As it is known, forD ⊆ A, PA (D) =
PB(D)
PB(A)
,
PB (D) =
PC(D)
PC(B)
and PB (A) =
PC(A)
PC(B)
, so, PA (D) =
PC (D)
PC (B)
PC(A)
PC (B)
= PC(D)
PC(A)
. In
the general case, qualitative probabilities are not the same necessarily,
but for each A ⊆ B ⊆ C, B 6= ∅, PC (A) = PB (A)PC (B).
The notion of relative null events defines an ordering in the events
space with elements boundlessly smaller than other elements. When A
is null and B is non null at C, for any finite partitioning {Bk}
n
k=1 of
B, by nullity, for some k, Bk is non null at C . I.e., A is “infinitely”
smaller than B, violating the Archimedean property (see [5]). As it
is shown below, this non-Archimedean ordering defines an equivalence
relation in the events space such that the quocient space is a linearly
ordered set with the straightforward extension of the non-Archimedean
ordering to this quocient space.
Definition 7 (≫). Given events A and B, A ≫ B iff there exists a
event C ⊇ A,B such that A is non null at C, but B is null at C.
Lemma 19. ≫ is well defined.
Proof. Let A and B be events such that A≫ B. Suppose, by absurd,
there is a event D ⊇ A,B such that B is non null at D. Then, for
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some event C ⊇ A,B, A is non null at C and B is null at C, but for
some event D ⊇ A,B, B is non null at D.
By nullity, A ∪ B is non null at C because A ⊆ A ∪ B. Besides, as
B is null at C, by lemma above, B is null at A∪B. Moreover, as B is
non null at D, by nullity, B is non null at A ∪ B, a contradiction. 
By definition, A≫ ∅ for each event A 6= ∅.
Lemma 20. Given events A and B, A≫ B iff A is non null at A∪B,
but B is null at A ∪B.
Proof. Let A and B be events such that A≫ B. Then, for some event
C ⊇ A,B, A is non null at C and B is null at C. By nullity, A ∪ B
is non null at C because A ⊆ A ∪ B. Besides, as B is null at C, by
lemma above, B is null at A ∪B. Moreover, as A is non null at C, by
nullity, A is non null at A ∪ B. 
Lemma 21 (dominance - [5]). ≫ is irreflexive and transitive.
Proof. A ≫ A iff A is non null at A, so A 6= ∅, but A is null at A, so
A = ∅, a contradiction.
A≫ B ≫ C iff A is non null at A ∪B, but B is null at A ∪B, and
B is non null at B ∪ C, but C is null at B ∪ C. Then, A,B 6= ∅; and
A∪B is non null at A∪B ∪C, otherwise, by nullity, C ≫ B. Besides,
if B ∪ C is non null at A ∪ B ∪ C, by lemma above (contrapositive),
B is non null at A ∪ B ∪ C, and by nullity, B is non null at A ∪ B, a
contradiction. Thus, A∪B is non null at A∪B ∪C, and B ∪C is null
at A ∪ B ∪ C, implying, by nullity, A≫ C. 
From the non-Archimedean ordering, an equivalence relation on the
events space can be derived, and from this equivalence relation, a par-
titioning of this space in equivalence classes of Archimedean-orderable
events, resulting in a non-Archimedean linear ordering on the quocient
space.
Definition 8 (≈). Given events A and B, A ≈ B iff ¬ (A≫ B) and
¬ (B ≫ A).
By definition, A ≈ ∅ iff A = ∅. The class of the empty set is the
trivial equivalence class.
Lemma 22. Given non trivial events A and B, A ≈ B iff A and B
are non null at A ∪B.
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Proof. By lemma above and definition of ≈, A and B are non null at
A ∪ B, or both are null at A ∪ B. As A and B are non trivial, both
are non null at A ∪B. 
Lemma 23. ≈ is an equivalence relation on Σ.
Proof. See [5]. 
Lemma 24. On Σ/ ≈, ≫ is irreflexive, transitive and total.
Proof. Trivial. 
Lemma 25 (weak comparative probability - extended event indepen-
dence). Given A,B,C,D ∈ Σ such that A,B ⊆ C,D, C ≈ D ≫ ∅,
B ≥C A⇐⇒ B ≥C∪D A⇐⇒ B ≥D A.
Proof. By weak comparative probability - event independence, using
A,B ⊆ C,D ⊆ C ∪D. 
The lemma above defines the relation ≥C∪D as the unique qualitative
probability at C andD such that C ≈ D ≫ ∅. I.e., there is a unique (in
the sense above) qualitative probability on each non trivial equivalence
class in Σ/ ≈.
The discussion above shows that an agent would consider non null,
at least, each event of the equivalence class of a non empty event A, if
A was relevant for his/her decision making.
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Appendix B. Proof Sketch of the Representation
Theorem
B.1. SEU Representation.
Remark 7. I will give the proof for simple acts (simple lotteries in
[8]). The general case demands Uniform Monotonicity.
Definition 9 (LfA). For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and simple act f , define a
simple lottery on O as LfA = PA ◦ f |
−1
A .
In short, it is proved that f ∼A g if L
f
A = L
g
A for each couple of
simple acts f and g. The space of simple lotteries on O is endowed with
a weak order ≧A defined as L
f
A ≧A L
g
A iff f %A g, for each couple of
simple acts on A, f and g. It is proved that this lottery space endowed
with ≧A satisfies independence and Archimedean properties. The the-
orem 8.2 (page 107, [4]) provides the representation. The Bernoulli
index is the same for every A ∈ Σ\ {∅} if O is a mixture space sat-
isfying weak forms of the independence and Archimedean properties,
otherwise, each class has a Bernoulli index that preserves ordering for
constant acts only.
Definition 10 (non redundancy). Given a simple lottery
∑m
k=1 qk1ok ,
for some finite m ≥ 1, where 1ok (o) =
{
1, o = ok
0, o 6= ok
,
∑m
k=1 qk = 1, qk ≥
0 for k = 1, ..., m, its non redundant representation is
∑n
k=1 pk1ok , for
some finite n ≥ 1, where n ≤ m,
∑n
k=1 pk = 1, pk > 0 for k = 1, ..., n,
and ok = ol =⇒ k = l.
Lemma 26. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and simple lottery L =
∑n
k=1 pk1ok
(non redundancy), there exist a simple act f such that LfA = L.
Proof. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} there is a PA such that, for each B ⊆ A
and λ ∈ [0, 1], there is an event C ⊆ B satifying PA (C) = λPA (B).
Given that, choose A1 ⊆ A such that PA (A1) = p1PA (A), A2 ⊆
A\A1 such that PA (A2) =
p2
1−p1
PA (A\A1), A3 ⊆ A\ (A1 ∪A2) such
that PA (A3) =
p3
1−p1−p2
PA (A\ (A1 ∪ A2)), and so forth. Defining f =
o1A1...onAnh, where h is an arbitrary simple act, a simple act satisfying
LfA = L is obtained. 
Lemma 27. For each A,B ∈ Σ, B ⊆ A, B non null at A, simple lot-
teries L =
∑n
k=1 pk1ok and L
′ =
∑n′
k=1 p
′
k1o′k (non redundancy), simple
acts f and g such that LfB = L and L
g
B = L
′, and λ ∈ (0, 1], there is
C ⊆ B such that PA (C) = λPA (B), L
f
C = L and L
g
C = L
′.
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Proof. Take C =
⋃
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,n′
Cij such that Ci,j ⊆ f
−1 (oi) ∩ g
−1
(
o′j
)
∩ B
and PA (Ci,j) = λPA
(
f−1 (oi) ∩ g
−1
(
o′j
)
∩ B
)
. It is straightforward
that PA (C) = λPA (B), L
f
C = L and L
g
C = L
′. 
Lemma 28. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and simple acts f and g, f ∼A g if
LfA = L
g
A.
Proof. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and simple act f , define a simple lottery
as LfA = PA ◦ f
−1, which can be represented by
∑n
k=1 pk1ok(non redun-
dancy).
Claim 8. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and each couple of simple acts f and
g, f ∼A g if L
f
A = L
g
A = 1o.
Proof. Observe that f = oBf and g = oCg, where B,C ⊆ A and
PA (B) = PA (C) = 1. It is straightforward that PA (B ∩ C) = 1,
so, A\ (B ∩ C) is null at A, consequently, %A and %B∩C agree. By
definition of %B∩C , f ∼B∩C g, thus, for n = 1 the result follows. 
As induction hypothesis, assume that, for each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, each
couple of simple acts f and g, and each m < n, f ∼A g if L
f
A = L
g
A =∑m
k=1 pk1ok .
If LfA = L
g
A =
∑n
k=1 pk1ok for two simple acts f and g, by the defini-
tion of %A, there are Ai, Bi ⊆ A and PA (Bi) = PA (Ci) = pi for each
i = 1, ..., n, and a simple act h, such that
f ∼ Ao1B1...onBnh
g ∼ Ao1C1...onCnh.
Now, take D = C1∩Bn and E ⊆ Cn\Bn such that PA (E) = PA (D),
and define the simple act
k = o1EonDg.
As g ∼A\(D∪E) k, if D is null at A then, by nullity, D ∪ E is null at
A, %A agree with %A\(D∪E), consequently, g ∼A k.
However, if D is non null at A then, there are three possibilities:
(1). on ∼S o1, so, by eventwise monotonicity and the definition of
%E and %D,
onEo1 ∼ Eon ∼E o1 ∼E onDo1
onDo1 ∼ Don ∼D o1 ∼D onEo1
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so, by sure-thing consistency,
onEo1 ∼D∪E onDo1,
and, given that D is non null at A, by order-preserving lemma
g = (onEo1) (D ∪ E) g ∼A (onDo1) (D ∪ E) g = k.
(2). on ≻S o1, so,
onEo1 ∼D∪E g ≻D∪E k ∼D∪E onDo1 ⇒ E >D∪E D,
and, given that D is non null at A, by weak comparative probability -
event independence,
E >A D,
an absurd. Analogously for k ≻D∪E g, consequently, k ∼D∪E g, so,
given that D is non null at A, by order-preserving lemma
k = k (D ∪ E) g ∼A g (D ∪ E) g = g.
(3). o1 ≻S on, it is analogous to (2).
Thus, g ∼A k in each possible case. However, repeating this process
for D′ = C2 ∩ Bn and E
′ ⊆ (Cn\Bn) \E such that PA (E
′) = PA (D
′),
and defining the simple act
k′ = o2E
′onD
′k,
it is obtained that k ∼A k
′. So, after finite steps, it is obtained the
simple act
r ∼A o1D1...on−1Dn−1onBnh,
which, by construction, is equivalent to g at A, and, by induction
hypothesis and the definition of %A\Bn and %Bn , satisfies
r ∼ A\Bnf
r ∼ Bnf,
so, by sure-thing consistency,
r ∼A f .

The lemma above has proved that, for each simple lottery L, each
A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and each couple of simple acts f and g,
LfA = L
g
A = L =⇒ f ∼A g.
Definition 11 (≧A). For each each A ∈ Σ\ {∅} and lotteries L and
L′, L ≧A L
′if there are acts f and g, such that, LfA = L, L
g
A = L
′ and
f %A g. (≡A and 	A are defined as usual)
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As it is shown above, each simple lottery is generated by a simple
act. Besides, it is shown above that two simple acts that generate the
same lottery are equivalent. Thus, if a couple of simple acts f and g
satisfy f %A g, L
f
A = L and L
g
A = L
′, then each couple of simple acts
h and k satisfying LhA = L and L
k
A = L
′ must satisfy h %A k. I.e. ≧A
is well defined. Moreover, ≧A is a weak preference.
Lemma 29 (sure-thing consistency for lotteries). For each A,B ∈ Σ
such that B ⊆ A, and lotteries L1 and L2,
L1 ≧B L2 and L1 ≧A\B L2 =⇒ L1 ≧A L2
and
B is non null at A =⇒
(
L1 	B L2 and L1 ≧A\B L2 =⇒ L1 	A L2
)
.
Proof. By lemmas 26, 27, 28 and sure-thing consistency, the result
follows. 
Lemma 30 (order-preserving for lotteries). For each A,B ∈ Σ such
that B ⊆ A, B is non null at A, and lotteries L and L′,
L ≧B L
′
⇔
PA (B)L+(1− PA (B))L
′′ ≧A PA (B)L
′+(1− PA (B))L
′′ for each L′′.
Proof. Take acts f and g such that LfB = L and L
g
B = L
′. Observe
that, for each act h, LfBhA = PA (B)L+(1− PA (B))L
h
A\B and L
gBh
A =
PA (B)L
′ + (1− PA (B))L
h
A\B. Now, by the order-preserving lemma,
and using lemmas 26 and 28, the result follows. 
Observe that, by order-preserving for lotteries, for each A ∈ Σ, if,
for some B ⊆ A such that B non null at A, L ≧B L
′, then, for each
C ⊆ A such that C =A B, L ≧C L
′. I.e., the ordering between lotteries
at some non null event at A depend of the probability of this event at
A and nothing else.
Lemma 31. For each A,B,C ∈ Σ such that B,C ⊆ A, B =A C >A ∅,
and lotteries L1 and L2, L1 ≧B L2 ⇔ L1 ≧C L2.
Proof. By order-preserving for lotteries lemma,
L1 ≧B L2
⇔
PA (B)L1+(1− PA (B))L3 ≧A PA (B)L2+(1− PA (B))L3 for each L3
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⇔
PA (C)L1+(1− PA (C))L3 ≧A PA (C)L2+(1− PA (C))L3 for each L3
⇔
L1 ≧C L2.

Lemma 32 (small event continuity for lotteries). For each each A ∈
Σ\ {∅}, and lotteries L1,L2 and L3 such that L1 	A L2 and L3 constant,
there exists a finite partition of A, {Ak}
n
k=1 ⊆ Σ, such that
L1 	A (1− PA (Ak))L2 + PA (Ak)L3
and
(1− PA (Ak))L1 + PA (Ak)L3 	A L2,
for each k = 1, ..., n.
Proof. By lemma 26 and small event continuity, the result follows. 
Observe that versions of sure-thing consistency and small event con-
tinuity for lotteries are simpler than the original versions.
Lemma 33 (Independence). For each each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, each ρ ∈ (0, 1]
and each pair of lotteries L1 and L2,
L1 ≧A L2 ⇔ ρL1 + (1− ρ)L3 ≧A ρL2 + (1− ρ)L3 for each L3.
Proof. First, observe that the lemma can be rewritten as: for each
A,B ∈ S such that B ⊆ A and B is non null at A, ≧A and ≧B agree.
Given A,B ∈ Σ such that B ⊆ A and B is non null at A, and
lotteries L1 and L2, by lemma 31, whether L1 ≧A L2 ⇐⇒ L1 ≧B L2 is
true is independent of B, although it is dependent on PA (B). Thus,
henceforth, the notation B (α) is used for an incognito event in A with
PA (B (α)) = α .
Given the discussion above, it shall be proved that, for each α > 0,
L1 and L2, L1 ≧A L2 ⇐⇒ L1 ≧B(α) L2.
If, for each α > 0, L1 ≡B(α) L2, there is nothing to prove, because %A
and %B(1) agree, consequently, for each acts f and g such that L
f
A = L1
and LgA = L2, it follows that L
f
B(1) = L1, L
g
B(1) = L2 and f ∼B(1) g,
so, f ∼A g and L1 ≡A L2. Thus, henceforth, it is assumed that there
exists α0 > 0 such that L1 B(α0) L2. (	 is analogous)
If α + β ≤ 1, and B (α) and B (β) are such that L1 ≧B(α) L2 and
L1 ≧B(β) L2 then, by lemma 31, they can be taken disjoint and, by
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lemma 26, there are acts f and g such that Lf
B(α) = L
f
B(β) = L1 and
Lg
B(α) = L
g
B(β) = L2, which imply that f %B(α) g and f %B(β) g,
and by sure-thing consistency, f %B(α)⊔B(β) g . As, by construc-
tion, Lf
B(α)⊔B(β) = L1, L
g
B(α)⊔B(β) = L2 and B (α) ⊔ B (β) is an event
B (α + β), L1 ≧B(α+β) L2.
If B (α) is such that L1 ≧B(α) L2 then, taken a n-fold uniform parti-
tion of B (α),
{
Bj
(
α
n
)}n
j=1
, by lemma 26, there are acts f and g such
that Lf
Bj(αn)
= L1 and L
g
Bj(αn)
= L2 for each j = 1, ..., n, consequently,
Lf
B(α) = L1, L
g
B(α) = L2, f %B(α) g and, by sure-thing consistency,
f %
Bj(αn)
g for some j, i.e.L1 ≧B(αn)
L2.
Both paragraphs above and L1 B(α0) L2 imply that,
L1 B(qα0) L2 for each q ∈ Q ∩
(
0,
1
α0
]
.
As L1 and L2 are simple lotteries and L1 B(α0) L2, taking the most
preferred outcome in {w : L1 (w) + L2 (w) > 0}, v, by lemma 26, there
are acts f and g such that Lf
B(α0)
= L1 and L
g
B(α0)
= L2, and by small
event continuity, given the constant act v, there is a finite partition
{Bj (α0j)}
n
j=1 of B (α0) such that
vBj (α0j) f ≺B(α0) g
for each j = 1, ..., n.
Observe that, by definition of v, using sure-thing consistency if it is
needed, v %Bj(α0j ) g for each j = 1, ..., n, and, by sure-thing consis-
tency again, v %B(α0) g. Besides, for each j, α0j < α0, otherwise,
PB(α0) (Bj (α0j)) = 1, consequently, %B(α0) and %Bj(α0j) agree, and
v ≺Bj (α0j) g, an absurd. Moreover, for some j, α0j > 0, otherwise,
α0 = 0, an absurd. Thus, given a j such that 0 < α0j < α0, given the
definition of v, if f %B(α0)\Bj(α0j ) g then vBj (α0j) f %B(α0)\Bj(α0j ) g . As
vBj (α0j) f %Bj(α0j) g, by sure-thing consistency, vBj (α0j) f %B(α0) g,
an absurd, i.e.
f ≺B(α0)\Bj(α0j ) g.
Now, take any β ∈ (0, α0j). So, for each B (β) ⊆ Bj (α0j), given the
definition of v, using sure-thing consistency if it is needed, v %B(β) g
and v %Bj (α0j)\B(β) f , so, vB (β) f %B(β) g and vBj (α0j) f %Bj(α0j)\B(β)
vB (β) f , consequently, as vBj (α0j) f ∼B(α0)\Bj(α0j) vB (β) f , by sure-
thing consistency, vBj (α0j) f %B(α0)\B(β) vB (β) f . Now, if vBj (α0j) f
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%B(α0)\B(β) g then, as vBj (α0j) f %B(β) g, by sure-thing consistency,
vBj (α0j) f %B(α0) g, an absurd, consequently,
vB (β) f ≺B(α0)\B(β) vBj (α0j) f ≺B(α0)\B(β) g,
i.e.
f ≺B(α0)\B(β) g.
From what was shown above, if 0 < β < α0j < α0 and L1 B(α0) L2,
then, by lemma 26 and lemma 27,
L1 B(α0−β) L2
The steps above imply that, for each β ∈ (0, α0j),
L1 B(q(α0−β)) L2 for each q ∈ Q ∩
(
0,
1
α0 − β
]
,
consequently,
L1 B(x) L2 for each x ∈ (0, 1] ,
implying that L1 A L2. 
Corollary 1. For each A,B ∈ Σ\ {∅} such that B ≈ A, ≧A and ≧B
agree.
Proof. Take A ∪B and apply the independence lemma. 
Lemma 34. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, if L2 	A L1.and 0 ≤ ρ < σ ≤ 1,
then ρL1 + (1− ρ)L2 	A σL1 + (1− σ)L2.
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from the independence lemma (see
page 72, [8]). It is just algebra. 
Lemma 35 (Archimedean). For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, if L2 	A L1 and
L2 ≧A L3 ≧A L1 for some fixed lottery L3, then there is one and only
one ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that L3 ≡A ρL1 + (1− ρ)L2.
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from lemmas 26 and 34, Dedekind
cut and small event continuity (see page 73, [8]). The Fishburn’s ver-
sion is more complete (see page 205, [4]). 
Theorem 9. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, there is a real-valued function uA
on O satisfying
L ≧A L
′ ⇔
∑
o:L(o)>0
uA (o)L (o) ≥
∑
o:L′(o)>0
uA (o)L
′ (o)
for all simple lotteries L and L′ on O. Besides, uA is unique up to a
positive affine transformation.
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Proof. For each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, as ≧A is a weak preference satisfying
independence and Archimedean properties, using the theorem 8.2, page
107, [4], the result follows. 
Lemma 36. For each A,B ∈ Σ\ {∅} such that B ≈ A, uA and uB are
related by a positive affine transformation.
Proof. It is straightforward from corollary 1. 
Lemma 37. For the set of constant lotteries, ≧A and ≧B agree.for
each A,B ∈ Σ\ {∅}.
Proof. It is a straightforward consequence of eventwise monotonicity
and the definition of ≧A and ≧B. 
Definition 12 (mixture space). A mixture space is a 2-uple (X,m)
with X a non empty set and m : [0, 1]×X2 → X such that m (1, x, y) =
x, m (α, x, y) = m (1− α, y, x) and m (α,m (β, x, y) , y) = m (αβ, x, y).
Theorem 10. For a mixture space (X,m) and a weak preference %
on X, there exist a unique, up to affine transformations, real-valued
function v : X → R such that
∀x, y ∈ X (x % y ⇔ v (x) ≥ v (y))
and
∀x, y ∈ X∀α ∈ [0, 1] (v (m (α, x, y)) = αv (x) + (1− α) v (y)) ,
if, and only if,
(1) ∀x, y, z ∈ X∀α ∈ (0, 1) (x ≻ y ⇒ m (α, x, z) ≻ m (α, y, z))
and
(2)
∀x, y, z ∈ X (x ≻ y ≻ z ⇒ ∃α, β ∈ (0, 1) (m (α, x, z) ≻ y ≻ m (β, x, z))) .
Proof. See theorem 8.4, page 112, [4]. 
Lemma 38. If O is convex then the set of constant acts withm (α, o, o′)
= αo+(1− α) o′ ∈ O is a mixture space. Besides, if %S on this mixture
space satisfies 1 and 2, then ≧A and ≧B agree.for each A,B ∈ Σ\ {∅}.
Proof. A convex combination of two constant acts o and o′ is a con-
stant act αo + (1− α) o′ for some α ∈ [0, 1], so, the first part follows
straightforwardly.
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If %S on this mixture space satisfies 1 and 2, then, by theorem 10,
there exist a unique, up to affine transformations, real function v : O →
R such that
∀o, o′ ∈ O (o %S o
′ ⇔ v (o) ≥ v (o′))
and
∀o, o′ ∈ O∀α ∈ [0, 1] (v (αo+ (1− α) o′) = αv (o) + (1− α) v (o′)) .
By lemma 37 and theorem 9, for each A ∈ Σ\ {∅}, uA and v are
related by a positive affine transformation. Thus, the second part fol-
lows. 
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of lemma 38, there is a real-valued
function v on O such that, for each A ∈ Σ\ {∅},
L ≧A L
′ ⇔
∑
o:L(o)>0
v (o)L (o) ≥
∑
o:L′(o)>0
v (o)L′ (o)
for all simple lotteries L and L′ on O. Besides, v is unique up to a
positive affine transformation.
Proof. It is straightforward from lemma 38. 
It is shown above that, under the conditions of lemma 38, there
exists a unique, up to affine transformations, event-independent weak
preference for simple lotteries on O. I.e., an agent has a unique well
defined ordering on simple lotteries and discrepancies between different
classes are implied by different hypothetical conditional beliefs only.
This idea is formalized below.
Definition 13 (≧). Under the conditions of lemma 38, for each pair
of simple lotteries L and L′ on O,
L ≧ L′ ⇔ L ≧A L
′,
for some A ∈ Σ\ {∅}.
Lemma 39. Under the conditions of lemma 38, for each pair of simple
acts f and g, and each A ∈ Σ\ {∅},
f %A g
⇔
LfA ≧ L
g
A
⇔∑
o:Lf
A
(o)>0 v (o)L
f
A (o) ≥
∑
o:Lg
A
(o)>0 v (o)L
g
A (o)
⇔∫
S
v (f (s)) dPA (s) ≥
∫
S
v (g (s)) dPA (s)
.
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Proof. By definition of ≧ and corollary 2. 
Anscombe and Aumann [2] assumes properties similar to lemma 38,
but in this work there is not an explicit mixture space structure on
non constant acts (i.e. Savage’s axioms are needed) and those proper-
ties on constant acts are assumed because they imply the uniqueness
mentioned above.
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